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Children and Crime: In the Moment 
 
 
 
How can we explain offending by children? How should we understand children’s relationship 
with crime? First of all, we must recognise that there is nothing absolute or universal about 
the categories of ‘offending’ and ‘crime’. Both are social constructions – the dynamic, 
contested and contingent creations of societies. Furthermore, the category of ‘child’ is itself 
a social construction - an invention/label that has been revised and reconstructed socio-
historically within and between nation states (Hendrick, 2015; Soung, 2011; Aries, 
1962/2002). These social constructions emerge from interactions between a multiplicity of 
socio-structural, cultural, economic, political, professional, academic, media and public 
influences and pressures (Hopkins-Burke, 2016; Bateman, 2014; Shore, 2011). The dominant 
influences/pressures at any given time and place, therefore, shape (even determine) our 
understandings of the processes by which children commit crime, are labelled as ‘offenders’ 
and are responded to through informal and criminal justice measures (cf. Case, 2018). 
Consequently, understanding children’s relationship with crime is redolent with dynamic 
complexity, contingency and nuance, all of which warrant exploration through a social 
constructionist lens.  
 
Notwithstanding the attendant complexity in understanding children’s relationship with 
crime, hegemonic social constructions of children who offend have followed particular 
patterns of partiality; partial in the dual sense of biased and limited. Children who commit 
crime have been traditionally labelled as ‘deviants’, a term often favoured by psychologists 
and psychiatrists to describe a child who has committed (possibly very few) offences. 
Similarly, ‘delinquent’ is a term particularly favoured by North American criminologists, whilst 
British and Australian criminologists tend towards ‘juvenile’ or ‘youth offender’ – all labels 
assigned to any child who has committed an offence and even those who might commit 
offences. These terms are employed uncritically, as if they have precise and well understood 
meanings, which they do not (cf. Hendrick, 2015; King, 2006; Haines and Drakeford, 1998). 
What does this lexicon imply? One could argue that the use of such language is simply a 
professional academic lingua, value free and without prejudice. On the other hand, our 
position is that the uncritical use of terms such as offender, offending, delinquent, juvenile 
and youth offender masks the essential characteristic of the ‘object of concern’, namely 
children. This unhealthy habit of not talking (and writing) about ‘children’ has led to the child 
being written out of too much criminology, particularly when seeking to explain offending 
behaviour and to design ‘appropriate’ responses to it. 
 
In explanatory/aetiological terms, the most influential/prolific group of theories of offending 
by children are quasi-positivist, deterministic, ‘artefactual’ risk factor theories (Kemshall, 
2008; Case and Haines, 2009) that explain crime as the result of exposure to psychosocial risk 
factors in childhood and adolescence (see Farrington, 2000). The practical corollary of these 
theories is the Risk Factor Prevention Paradigm (RFPP), which originated in the USA (Hawkins 
and Catalano, 1992) and has been subsequently adopted internationally, most notably 
England and Wales (Youth Justice Board, 2017; Ministry of Justice, 2016; Stephenson et al. 
2013). Despite its burgeoning evidence-base and widespread academic and professional 
popularity, the RFPP has been vilified by critics as deeply methodologically, conceptually and 
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ethically flawed to the point of invalidity (Case and Haines, 2009; see also Goddard and Myers, 
2017; Bateman, 2011; O’Mahoney, 2009). The fundamental flaw across artefactual risk factor 
theories, beside an insidious partiality, is a basic failure to engage the child – in principle, 
theory and practice (Case and Haines, 2014). 
 
This paper situates the child at the centre of our theorising and understandings of the child-
crime relationship. We start this process by making an assertion that directly challenges the 
hegemonic deterministic explanations shaping understandings of and responses to offending 
by children; namely that children think and act ‘in the moment’. We argue that the long-term 
consequences of their behaviour (i.e. anything subsequent to the act itself) are strangers to 
children – all children, in different places, at different times of boredom or excitement over 
the continuum of maturation. We seek to argue, therefore, that the behaviour of children is 
predominantly confined to the moment in which it takes place. Children, we assert, think and 
act ‘In the Moment’. To develop this notion, the lead authors assembled a range of expert 
international scholars, inviting them to explore the idea that children who offend do so by 
thinking and acting ‘in the moment’ (hereafter ItM). Authors were offered limited additional 
guidance or prescription, except the request to explore the ItM idea from their own 
perspective. The aim was to push forward the boundaries of understandings of children and 
offending. We wish to see how far (theoretically, conceptually, empirically and 
geographically) the notion of ItM can travel. The outcome of this open-ended brief has been 
a welcome and necessary diversity of perspectives that broadly coalesce around the 
anchoring theme of ItM, whilst concurrently challenging the embedded determinism and 
adult-centrism of established explanations of and responses to offending by children. 
 
Notwithstanding the diversity of approaches, common themes are identifiable, grounded in 
the sociologies of time (Urry, 1994; Adam, 1995) and childhood (James and Prout, 1997; 
Smith, 2010). Firstly, constructions of childhood are historically situated, being both 
contingent and transient, placing children in time, or ‘in the moment’, but in very specific and 
contestable ways. Secondly, partly as a consequence of contemporary constructions of 
childhood, the ‘timings’ of childhood assume a linear process of change and transition, both 
biologically and socially determined, but which place each and every child at a very specific 
point in the lifecycle (‘in the moment’). Thirdly, children’s own sense of time may well be 
distinctive, with a foreshortening of experience and a greater sense of living ‘in the moment’ 
than those of other generations, whose perspective and experience are necessarily much 
longer. As has been observed, even children’s ‘clock time’ may not be the same as that of 
adults (Forman, 2015). 
 
The journey to more holistic, inclusive, situated and constructivist understandings of children 
and crime begins with an exposition of the broader context and nature of childhood, within 
which constructions of children have developed. There follows an exploration of the 
implications of gender for explanatory arguments and the potential need for gendered 
explanations of children’s offending in the moment. We follow this by examining in the 
moment in the context of the emerging neurological evidence-base that relates children’s 
offending to developing brain function and the nervous system. Next comes a series of 
constructivist explanations that consider how children experience, negotiate, resist and 
therefore construct their environments; moreover, how these constructions may shed light 
on the relationship between children and crime ItM. These explanatory foci address ItM in 
 3 
the context of social ecology, risk/needs, critical moments and resilience. The paper concludes 
by examining certain what could be perceived of as new frontiers in explaining and responding 
to children’s offending, specifically contemporary, progressive incarnations of diversion from 
the formal criminal justice system and the ‘children first’ model of positive youth justice.  
 
Childhood ItM 
Our approach to children who are identified as offenders depends crucially on how we 
understand childhood itself. We want to propose a particular characterisation which sees 
childhood as a common but differentiated experience for those passing through this 
particular life stage. Its common features are few, but significant, and are less defined by 
particular developmental features and fixed trajectories than by material aspects of changing 
lives which are specifically time limited – momentary, in fact. 
 
Children are defined by their: physiological status, relatively limited experience, growing 
knowledge, and restricted access to material resources, and as a consequence of these 
necessary conditions, childhood can be typified as a period of relative vulnerability (Smith, 
2010). By contrast, children’s existence is not delimited by a lack of ‘agency’, limited capacity 
for understanding, or developmental constraints which render them less able than adults to 
exercise self-control or make (good or bad) moral judgements. They are not inherently either 
anti- or asocial. 
 
The problem posed for those concerned with the ideologies, institutions, organisation and 
delivery of youth justice is that once we accept children’s agency as a given, they become 
readily exposed to conventional and well-established forms of reasoning associated with 
attributions of blame and responsibility.  These, though, need to be modified in light of both 
the generalised characteristics of childhood set out here; and, equally importantly, the 
differential manner in which these characteristics are impacted and modified by the 
contextualised real-life experiences of unequal social structures (class) and differentiation 
(ethnicity, gender) to which children are exposed. Here, then are the underpinnings of a case 
for a system of justice which is explicitly embedded in and springs from the identifiable shared 
features of childhood, against which they can be judged to share common needs and hold 
universally applicable rights. 
 
We might perhaps go further and argue that ‘offending’ or problematic behaviour is 
intelligible in light of these potential influences and children’s active choice-making in 
response, thus framing intervention in terms of the wider needs and factors which are 
inherently and inevitably constitutive of specific lived experiences. Matza’s attempt to 
conceptualise the contingent nature of children’s delinquent choices in terms of constrained 
or contextualised decision-making remains pertinent here: ‘Drift stands midway between 
freedom and control. Its basis is an area of the social structure in which control has been 
loosened…. drift may be initiated or deflected by events so numerous as to defy codification’ 
(Matza, 1964, pp. 28-9). As he also observes in this context, delinquent acts themselves take 
place periodically and inconsistently and do not represent or constitute the entirety of a 
child’s life or identity. Offences are carried out ItM. 
 
Offending behaviour may not be caused by a particular set of prior factors or characteristics, 
nor is it simply the result of unconstrained deliberate acts in pursuit of self-interest. Instead, 
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it can be located within the broader context of childhood experience and opportunities 
(‘habitus’, perhaps). In similar vein, then, interventions which seek to address offending 
behaviour ‘out of context’, or even simply to prioritise it as against other aspects of children’s 
lives are bound to represent only limited or partial solutions. Instead, attention should be 
paid to those features of all childhoods which are a necessary prerequisite to ‘good lives’, as 
they progress through this particular phase, essentially constituted as: physical well-being, 
adequate resources, positive learning opportunities and effective safeguards. The criminal 
justice system, especially in its institutional elements, remains singularly ill-equipped to 
address these essential ingredients of a good childhood. Indeed, it may well be a source of 
further harm and neglect, therefore compounding the factors which are damaging for 
children. The argument here is that offending cannot be dealt with effectively unless these 
crucial aspects of children’s lives are attended to; and it is therefore the primary duty of 
criminal justice (and other) agencies to ensure that they are met. 
 
Of course, it is not new to argue that attending to the issues of childhood is the most 
important consideration when addressing the problem of youthful offending (leaving aside 
the equally crucial question of how such behaviour is defined and problematised). Rutherford 
(1992) argued that the most important task for practitioners was simply to ‘hold on’, to take 
a longer view – beyond the moment - and provide continuing support for children in trouble 
as their lives developed and changed; and of course, more recently, we have been urged to 
consider the child ‘first’ and the offending subsequently (Haines and Case, 2015). 
 
Gender ItM  
In the same way that we have made assumptions about the ’delinquent’ as biologically, 
psychologically or socially flawed and somehow distinct from ‘us’, similar hegemonic 
assumptions are apparent when we look at the question of gender. The evidence is 
undisputable: boys are more likely than girls to commit crime, to commit violent crime and to 
wind up in youth justice systems (Kruttschnitt, 2013). This has been found to be the case 
across cultures and time. Since the late 1990s, however, international debates have emerged 
about whether this gender gap is narrowing – with males and females converging towards 
similar arrest patterns (Schwartz and Steffensmeier, 2015). Popular portrayals have 
characterised girls, in particular, as becoming increasingly more like their male counterparts 
in crime and violence (Chesney Lind, 2006), prompting a revisiting of the ’liberated female 
crook‘ hypothesis that correlates the increase in female participation in crime with women’s 
liberation (Joe and Chesney Lind, 1995). Some observers argue that this increasing 
convergence is related to ’greater gender equality‘ (Beatton, Kidd and Machin, 2017:15; 
Prothrow-Stitch and Spivak, 2005) or lower national levels of patriarchy (Savolainen et al. 
2017).    
 
Whether one subscribes to the gender gap or convergence model, it remains the case that 
there are – whether small or large – gender differences in children’s offending and 
representation in youth justice systems. The task at hand is to understand this difference in 
the context of how and why boys and girls engage in crime.  While there has long been the 
desire in criminology to derive a general theory of crime based on biopsychosocial positivist 
explanations, the subjective understanding and experience in the commission of crime is 
central to theorizing and to policy – what was s/he thinking at the time and what was s/he 
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experiencing ItM? There are a number of instructive works to address this question of the 
subjective experience and the immediacy of the event in the context of gender differences.   
 
Some criminologists argue that much of crime involves a rational calculation of the costs and 
benefits of an immediate site for crime (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Cornish and Clarke, 1987). 
Yet cultural criminologists argue that even taking into account the instrumental nature of 
crime, there is an emotional currency involved.  Hayward (2007), for example, argues that 
what may appear to be a reasoned response to immediate opportunities is very likely, instead, 
a reflection of youthful engagement with the ‘culture of now’ – an expression of the cultural 
logic and materialities of contemporary consumerism. Accordingly, children as ‘sensation 
gatherers‘ of late modernity (drawing on Bauman) are caught in a whirlwind of emotions – 
‘dis-satisfaction, narcissism, impulsivity, and spontaneity – frequently the very emotions 
behind a whole host of risk-laden criminal acts… illegal forms of excitement represent a break 
with the banalities of everyday life and mark the entry into a new world of possibilities and 
pleasures‘ (2007: 239). Lyng’s (1990) notion of edgework - a form of voluntary risk taking – 
operates with a similar cultural logic, drawing on the emotional engagement with danger, risk 
and the controlled feelings of loss of control to transcend mundane realities to a state of 
temporary existential freedom, although we note here that edgework may be of a 
spontaneous or planned nature.  
 
Our point here is to underscore the emotional and expressive nature of children’s crime. From 
a number of studies on the situational context of crime, the gender differences in the 
emotional dimensions and immediacy of children’s crime become clear.  Research on gangs 
and street-life, for example, have long recognized the salience of ’honour’ and ‘respect‘ on 
the streets and violence has been one expressive means – both a ‘battleground and theater’ 
– for adolescent minority boys to accomplish and reaffirm masculinity (Bourgois, 2003; Fraser, 
2015). Yet “honour” and “respect” are also important for girls on the street, albeit 
differentially understood and in different situational contexts. For girls, street life is highly 
patriarchal and within this gendered environment, defending ‘honour’ in the immediate – is 
framed around sexual reputation and relationships with family, peers and lovers, and 
negotiated in the context of social and cultural norms of femininity (Joe Laidler and Hunt, 
2003; Irwin and Adler, 2012). 
 
In trying to understand the gender gap in relation to the immediacy of the moment, these 
studies suggest that a) situational context plays an important role in street interactions and 
in crime, and b) these interactions occur in a highly patriarchal environment in which there 
are ItM contestations about honour, respect and more broadly, masculinity and femininity. 
Stepping back, these studies call into question our adult-centric assumptions and reference 
points in understanding children and crime, including children and adult’s understandings of 
‘risk’.  
 
Neurological maturation and ItM 
Developmental neuroscience traces the physiological maturation of the brain and nervous 
system through the ageing process. Recent advances in this science have challenged prior 
understandings in showing adolescence – defined as the period from puberty to adulthood – 
to be a key phase of functional brain development towards the ‘adult form’ and second only 
to infancy in the extent of maturation that is occurring within neural systems (Whittle et al. 
 6 
2014). Several processes are now recognised as taking place during this period (Johnson et al. 
2009). Counter to prior assumptions, it is now understood that certain regions of the brain 
continue to develop through adolescence. In particular, the frontal lobes are now known to 
be ‘among the last areas of the brain to mature; they may not be fully developed until halfway 
through the third decade of life’ (Johnson et al. 2009: 216). This region of the brain is key to 
the exercise of ‘higher order executive functions’, such as planning and sequencing complex 
tasks and responding to novel and changing circumstances. It is also now understood that the 
refinement of neural networks and the connectivity of brain regions ‘continues to develop 
well into adulthood’ (Johnson et al, 2009: 217-8). These processes are crucial to the consistent 
regulation of feelings, stress, and impulses in different social contexts, which is dependent on 
connectivity between the cognitive processes of the frontal lobes and the emotional 
processing performed by the amygdala. 
 
Whilst generalisations mask significant heterogeneity in the timing of neuromaturation (Dahl, 
2008), an understanding of the neuromaturation typically occurring into our mid-20s adds 
further evidence to the idea that in certain circumstances children are prone to behaviour 
ItM, governed not by rational thought, but by emotion. In combination, these ongoing 
processes of brain development mean that, while children generally have similar cognitive 
capacities to adults, in terms of their ability to understand and retain information and to 
recognize the risks associated with particular behaviours, adolescents might process 
information and make decisions differently from adults when in particular states of emotional 
arousal – often referred to as situations of ‘hot cognition’ (Spear, 2013: Casey et al. 2008). For 
example, inhibitory control may be more likely to be ‘overcome’ in ‘stressful, emotionally 
charged, and arousing circumstances’ for adolescents than adults, including under the 
influence of peers (Spear, 2013: S7). This has been evidenced using various experiments in 
which tasks are carried out in emotional and non-emotional contexts. Typically, in these 
experiments ‘adolescents exhibited more risk-taking behaviour than adults only under the 
emotional version of the task’ (Spear, 2013: S10). For example, Gardner and Steinberg (2005) 
used a driving simulation game to compare the propensity of adults and adolescents to make 
‘risky decisions’, such as whether to speed through an amber light. Adolescents were found 
to make risky decisions significantly more often when driving in the presence of peers, 
compared to when they were alone. The presence of peers made no such impact on adults. 
Similar experiments have suggested that adolescents are typically less ‘harm avoidant’ than 
adults (Spear, 2013) and may discount larger future rewards in preference for smaller 
immediate gains – a phenomena known as ‘temporal discounting’ (Water et al. 2014; Lee et 
al. 2013). It has also been suggested that the still-developing adolescent brain weighs 
emotional and social aspects of decisions over longer term outcomes (Crone and Dahl, 2012). 
In particular, achieving social status or peer acceptance appear more highly salient to 
adolescent decision-making than the knowledge that the decision may have negative 
consequences, such as a criminal record that might affect future prospects.  
 
Whilst recognising significant individual variability, the research reviewed so far broadly 
examines ‘typical’ neuromaturation processes fostering ItM behaviour. However, a wealth of 
research signifies the high levels of significant neurodevelopmental impairments 
disproportionately experienced by children in youth justice systems (Hughes et al. 2012). 
Neurodevelopmental impairments can occur when there is disruption in the development of 
the brain or other aspects of the nervous system, due to causes such as genetics, birth trauma, 
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injury, illness, or severe nutritional or emotional deprivation and are experienced as 
significant functional difficulties with cognition and learning, communication and/or 
emotional functioning (Patel et al. 2011; APA, 2013) – rendering ItM explanations for 
offending more likely than their rational or determinist counterparts because:  
 
• Deficits in executive functioning can influence such behaviour by ‘decreasing 
behavioural inhibition, impairing the ability to anticipate behavioral consequences 
and assess punishment and reward, [and/or] damaging the capability to generate 
socially appropriate behavior in challenging contexts’ (Ogilvie et al. 2011: 1064); 
• Impulsivity is particularly implicated in certain forms of ItM behaviour, with a ‘de-
coupling of cognition and emotion’ being expressed as impatience, sensation-seeking 
and difficulties in restraining emotional reactions (Williams, 2013). This can increase 
the likelihood of spontaneous, impulsive acts, particularly in response to provocation 
or conflict;  
• Poor social communication may result in difficulties understanding and expressing 
emotions, including through non-verbal communication techniques and therefore the 
use of challenging behaviour as a means to communicate emotions (Ryan et al. 2013).  
 
In combination then, this diverse body of research regarding neuromaturation demonstrates 
that children may weigh decisions about behaviour differently to adults in certain contexts 
and situations and may do so inconsistently and irrationally. Children therefore have a greater 
propensity towards ItM behaviour, particularly when emotions ‘run high’ and in the presence 
of peers, including engaging in behaviour which they know to be criminal, antisocial or 
inappropriate. While potentially prone to deterministic accounts that sustain ‘widespread 
prejudices and myths about children being incapable of rational thought, self-restraint and 
good judgment’ (Bessant, 2008: 353), such conclusions simply suggest that children should 
not be assumed to be ‘mini-adults’, always exercising rational thought, but are instead in need 
of our understanding and support when their decision-making surprises us. 
 
Critical moments and ItM 
This aspect or case study of our ItM approach emphasises a ‘double moment’ operating at 
both structurally and individually. There is the ‘moment’, which constitutes a particular 
conjuncture of psychosocial, economic and political change, bringing together these aspects 
of rapid change at one time and in one place and into which a child is born and brought up. 
Then there is the individual ‘moments’ that constitute a child’s experience as they live through 
this conjuncture, while being shaped by it.      
 
The knowledge that children living under psychosocial conditions marked by stress, anxiety 
and insecurity are more likely to offend is commonplace. It is also the case that a lack of 
material resources can diminish parental support and the ability of family members to meet 
and overcome unexpected events and crises (Webster and Kingston, 2014). Social 
structurally, some children are more likely to experience their environment uncertainly as 
lacking purpose and predictability. This is something that is done to them rather than chosen 
by them, done to their family members rather than chosen by them. Some research argues 
that the influence of ‘close relations’ in families is more important than the ‘social sorting and 
selection’ of populations composing impoverished neighbourhoods, where poverty and 
inequality are concentrated in the wider society (Gash, 2016). Influential studies concur that 
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family, school and peer influences are more important than structural background factors like 
poverty or inequality (Sampson and Laub, 1993). In the context of these sorts of arguments 
what then does it mean to say that children live and act in the moment and does this claim 
help us understand why children offend and how we respond to offending? 
 
One way of beginning to answer this question is to review a series of qualitative longitudinal 
studies of transitions from childhood to young adulthood carried out in the north east of 
England1. The aspect of these studies focusing on the impact of poverty on crime, showed 
what subsequently occurred in young lives was profoundly influenced by the ‘moment’ of 
where and when they were born. Significantly, the study population were born between 1974 
and 1984, on the cusp and in the depths, of a period of rapid deindustrialisation and 
neighbourhood impoverishment. Again, they did not choose where and when they were born 
nor the diminishment of their families, who had mostly been employed as skilled 
manufacturing workers. The point thus far is that children’s ‘moments’ can be born of 
conditions not of their choosing from the beginning – the historical moment or conjuncture 
of their birthplace and upbringing. In a sense, to live and act in the moment is always to do so 
in one’s ineluctable time and place.  
 
Among this research population, children reached early to late teenage in the early to mid-
1990s, coinciding with the novel embedding of a cheap and plentiful local heroin market 
where they lived – places having no appreciable previous history of heroin use. For us though, 
a bigger picture emerged of heroin’s function as a ‘poverty drug’, ridding users of the 
associated anxiety, boredom and depression of living poor lives in a deindustrialised place. 
Poor transitions characterised by early teenage truancy, school exclusion, parental rejection, 
children’s homes and later, continuous unemployment and some ‘fiddly work’, led to feelings 
of depression and anxiety, that were momentarily alleviated and forgotten by heroin’s raison 
d'être, ‘living and acting in the moment’.  
 
Over their lives, for the children to whom we spoke, ‘stuff happened’ in unpredictable, but 
not random ways. Life changing moments could turn people away from and toward offending 
and drug use, even within a single biography. Cumulative crisis moments and life experiences 
(e.g. accidents, ill health, bereavement, financial crises, drug-use opportunities, particular 
sorts of street encounters) could trigger or discourage offending. By this is meant that these 
crises are not merely random or chance occurrences – although sometimes this came into it 
– but that such moments are more likely to occur in the generation and place studied, where 
individual resilience and capacity to ‘cope’ with crises and critical moments is at a premium 
under conditions of severe social and economic hardship. 
 
The Teesside research team scratched their heads about what policy, policing or criminal 
justice responses might help rather than hinder any positive developments among children 
leading disrupted, impoverishing lives. Except to argue that the particular timing and placing 
of this historical conjuncture of deindustrialisation, social and economic crisis, and generation 
was the policy. This policy moment was the systematic impoverishment and destabilisation of 
children’s lives in the place and at the time as matters of government policy.      
 
 
1 Together known as ‘The Teesside Studies’, see Webster et al. 2006, Shildrick et al. 2012) 
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Risk and need or ItM? 
Responses to the behaviour of children who come into contact with the justice system have 
been generally understood to oscillate between welfare and punishment overlaid by risk-
oriented logics and (recently) the emerging positive youth justice model based on a ’children-
first‘ approach (Haines and Case, 2015). Or, more precisely, when it comes to handling 
children who are caught breaking rules or laws, what commonly takes place is a hybridized 
form of welfare, ‘law and order’ and actuarial assemblages that blend together in a somewhat 
contradictory yet compatible way (Goddard, 2012; Muncie, 2006; Gray, 2013). Nevertheless, 
regardless of which orientation dominates at a particular moment, the idea that children live 
and act ItM has the potential to significantly alter these logics, particularly when we consider 
the so-called ‘risks’ and ‘needs’ of children. 
 
Although criminologists have observed the age-crime curve for some time now, recent 
neuroscience (see Neuromaturation section) suggests that the significant uptick in youth 
offending is closely linked to the knowledge that, quite literally, children are neurologically 
wired to act in the moment. Children are quite simply prone to risk-taking behaviours. What 
this implies is that risk-taking behaviours that violate norms, rules and laws are not evidence 
that children are ‘delinquents’. They are evidence that children are children. 
 
What then are the implications for youth justice explanations and responses? Specifically, 
what might understanding youth offending as acting ItM mean for the risk-oriented approach 
that forecasts the likelihood that a child will offend by assessing their personality, 
psychological state, peer networks and family, school and community environments? The 
hegemonic Risk Factor Prevention Paradigm (RFPP - see Introduction) has  been encoded into 
the increasingly popular risk assessment instruments - assessing danger by retrospectively 
examining the lives of ‘offenders’, establishing links between the ‘deficiencies’ they 
demonstrate and the deficiencies demonstrated by offenders who were followed in 
longitudinal studies (West and Farrington, 1977) and then calculates a categorical predictive 
score about their risk/ likelihood to reoffend. The identified deficiencies (or ‘risks’ and ‘needs’) 
exist within individual personalities and psychologies of children or in relation to the family, 
school, community and the peer group of delinquent individuals (Farrington, 2000). The idea 
is that risks and needs increase the probability of offending, leading to the conclusion that 
criminality can be prevented by implementing measures designed to counteract them. 
 
The paradigm is seductive, and there is evidence to support the association of each variable 
(risk factor) with offending. However, if we replace the analytic lens with the idea that 
children (regularly) live and act ItM, the relationship between risk factors and behaviour take 
on a different meaning. For one, all children are periodically but varyingly ‘at risk’. Thus, 
categorising some youth and not others as ‘at risk’ is no longer accurate or meaningful. Of 
course, a reply may be to argue that the science of predicting should be viewed more 
dimensionally than categorically; that is, by understanding individuals along a continuum of 
risk of offending. Our rejoinder is that, regardless of the number of risks/needs a child is 
assessed as having, children act ItM. Risk factors may predict that a child will be at higher risk 
for offending, but they are just that: influencing factors. They tell us little about the 
mechanisms by which children end up offending, one of which being that they act on impulse 
ItM. 
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The conceptualisation that risk factors are a primary source of wayward behaviour is 
therefore removed from the picture. No longer can we think of children who are caught 
breaking rules or laws as different. All children may have the potential to offend or exhibit 
problematic behaviour. Labelling some children as ‘at-risk’ is literally inaccurate. Secondly, 
and somewhat parenthetically, the ItM perspective may well explain why there are dozens of 
risk factors in the RFPP and to why each risk factor is only modestly associated with 
delinquency. There are many different profiles of children that offend, but most common to 
children is that they are neurologically prone to act in the moment. We might even suggest 
that risk assessment instruments that encode risk factors are an elegant way to categorize 
acting ItM and impose the idea that children who have been caught have some proclivity for 
delinquency or what looks like motivation. 
 
Given our argument, what does this mean for policy? First, zero tolerance for nearly every 
wayward or non-serious but nevertheless rule-breaking behaviour and punitive responses in 
general, seems ill-advised. Second, viewing ‘offending’ that integrates what we know about 
place and crime, serious and persistent young offenders and the ItM perspective opens the 
door to seeing more clearly a feedback loop ripe for policy interventions, namely that serious 
and persistent offending children regularly experience housing, food, clothing and safety 
insecurities—and persistent waves of adverse experiences associated with the conditions of 
poverty—that collectively undermine the effectiveness of their neurological behaviours and 
functions, such as planning, prioritizing and controlling impulses (Maroney, 2011). 
Policymakers should therefore not only prioritize keeping children away from youth justice 
involvement, but also target the troubling social ecologies surrounding children. We would 
do so, not because of ‘risks’ or ‘needs’ that these environments engender, but because they 
delay, interrupt, or undermine the regular transitions through childhood, including the 
maturation toward less impulse-driven behaviour. 
 
Resistance and Resilience ItM  
As discussed in the previous section, groups of children are labelled, through public discourse, 
as ‘risky’ or ‘troubled’ when they offend and become subject to stigmatising and 
counterproductive early involvement with youth justice systems (and preventative 
interventions). How do they respond to the label, and the limits that label places on them? 
Crucially, can these varying levels of agentic responses be seen to be ItM?  
 
While processes of early and criminal activity may be chalked up to the impulsivity of children 
acting ItM, so too can their subsequent responses to imposed sanctions and reactions to 
those in positions of power.  Current research is concerned with how children respond to 
stigma, aiming to uncover some of the ways they react to the label through resistance, 
resilience and resourcefulness (Harragan et al. 2018). These responses demonstrate longer-
term resistance to adversity (Newman, 2004) and highlight the impulsive, reactive actions 
that happen in the moment. We argue, here, that ItM actions are likely to be impulsive and 
reactive. However, they occur within a ‘contextual’ moment formed from a crucial set of 
socio-demographic and experiential factors; in the moment actions are a response to situated 
injustice. 
 
Thus, children’s ItM actions can be seen as a complex response to stigma and the processes 
they face as they enter a world of youth justice intervention. There’s a complexity to the 
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contextual ‘build-up’ of an off-the-cuff action – a series of triggering events, experiences and 
contexts - and while the action that sparks the authorial response may be ItM (impulsive, off-
the-cuff, influenced by peers) it is borne out of a build-up of frustration and resentment 
(Harragan et al. 2018). It is a response to injustice and individual narratives and it is built on a 
series of presumptions, stigmas and labels. 
 
The labelling of children as ‘risky’ typically generates tension: disproportionate targeting, 
labelling and problematic relationships between children and the police, for example, have 
been well-documented in the sociological/criminological literature (Newburn, 2011; Cohen, 
2002) resulting in what has been described as a ‘permanent suspect population’ (McAra and 
McVie, 2005: 27). The child’s reaction to the criminal marker can manifest as anti-social and 
criminal behaviour thus reinforcing the ‘problem’ label and perpetuating risk discourses.  
 
Current responses to children seen to be ‘at risk’ of criminal behaviour, such as the use of 
systems of surveillance and control (Kemshall, 2008) and casting the net widely (not least 
through diversionary measures) (Smith, 2017), perhaps says more about the collective, 
accepted and normative views of our society than the children themselves. In her 2013 book 
‘Revolting subjects’, Imogen Tyler theorises the concept of social abjection as a way of 
exploring the exclusion of certain stigmatised groups and addressing the processes by which 
social agreements about who is abject becomes a consensus through repeated citation. The 
entrenched stigmatisation of certain youth populations (typically those with criminal records 
or from ‘high risk’ neighbourhoods) as out-of-control, feral and problematic, becomes 
embedded in normative belief systems and impacts on youth policy. 
 
Children’s actions (whilst the action may be ItM) are a response to injustice and resistance to 
their treatment by authorities and society, to their abjection, to the poverty of opportunity 
they face and to experiences of adversity. It’s because of these negative effects of stigma and 
marginalisation that opportunities for children to engage positively become limited and, as a 
result, much of the creativity, innovation and energy within these ‘criminalised’ groups is 
directed away from positive social action (Harragan et al. 2018) providing the perfect site for 
further ItM actions.  
 
There’s an opportunity here, for those involved in youth justice not only to recognise the 
complex build up that provides the context for ItM actions, but also to address the ways that 
formal responses to youth offending may trigger further ItM actions. If we agree that at least 
a proportion of children’s actions happen ItM our next question is what to do about it. Any 
analysis must focus on the positives within the complex and intersectional context of 
children’s actions: moving forward rather than looking back, positive youth justice rather than 
risk-based processes.  
 
Social ecology ItM 
Children being/acting ItM can be productively investigated through a social-ecological lens. 
From this perspective, human development occurs within ‘nested’ systems – microsystems, 
mesosystems, exosystems, macrosystems – that interrelate within a temporal and historic 
context: the chronosystem (Bronfenbrenner, 1995). Children in relationship with family, 
friends, school and neighbourhood settings live/act/interact in time. The processes that shape 
children’s actions/interactions and identity-development – what they do and how it defines 
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them – operate simultaneously in a socio-political-historic moment and at the micro-
processual scale of the everyday. 
 
Within these interconnected ecologies, adolescent development is shaped by increasingly 
complex relations (Bronfenbrenner, 1995; France et al. 2012). Children make sense of the 
world and their place in it, through ‘proximal processes’. Recognising how this sense-making 
occurs requires understanding the child, their spatial and temporal context and the proximal 
process itself (Bronfenbrenner, 1995). This way of understanding development has significant 
implications for youth justice interventions. It highlights the critical importance of 
relationships, built with increasing complexity, over time. To get to know how and why 
children live/act ItM workers need to understand, chronosystemically, the social processes 
influencing children’s actions/interactions.  
 
Recent research on children’s prolific offending in Wales2 reveals – through interviews with 
YOT workers/managers and young men previously (repeatedly) involved with the YOT – how 
effective youth justice practice reflects this understanding. For children, workers knowing 
‘what makes them tick’ signifies caring relationships built on trust and respect, as ‘Elis’ 
described: ‘[my worker] knew what made me tick, what I was a feeling…how to handle it’. This 
implies deep understanding of his character and temperament, his rhythms, motivations and 
desires. ‘Ticking’ evokes motion, growth, development, not a static identity (‘offender’). It 
reflects this young person’s sense of being cared for as young, understood in the moment of 
adolescence. 
 
For workers, seeing children in this way and identifying their genuine (not just ‘offending-
related’) needs means recognising how disadvantage, dysfunction and exclusion shapes 
identity and behaviour. Meeting their needs requires persistence, ‘sticking with them’ over 
time. The following examples3 are illustrative. One YOT manager evoked how children can 
change suddenly: ‘that moment where they go, you know what? I’m sick of this…I want to 
move [away] from that nonsense’ (YM01). Others have the intention, but lack resolve or 
resources (YW17).  
 
For YM04, effective intervention requires a deep understanding of ‘what’s going on’ in 
children’s lives. Seeing substance misuse as symptomatic of disadvantage and a search for 
identity and belonging, for instance, allows workers to tailor interventions to those needs, 
not the substance use alone. For the young men interviewed, ‘street Valium’ was prevalent 
at the time and drove their escalating violence: ‘Valium was the main thing…you start fights 
for no reason’ (Elis); ‘We terrorised our streets’ (Gareth). YOT worker YW18 described how: 
‘Valium was increasing their confidence in who they were…[Their] offending just 
escalated…burglaries…car offences…violence, robberies…serious offending.’ 
 
 
2 This 2015 study built on earlier work by YJB Cymru profiling a ‘prolific offending’ sample of 117 children who 
had 25+ offences recorded in 2009 and who reoffended in 2010. The 2015 study followed up this sample via 
case file analysis, reoffending data analysis, interviews with YOT staff and four of the young men, now aged 21-
23 (Johns, Williams & Haines 2016, 2017). 
3 These examples are from interviews with YOT workers/managers (YW## or YM##), and young men who were 
part of the original ‘prolific offending’ sample, given aliases here to protect anonymity (Johns et al 2016). 
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As well as violence, these boys’ lives – their micro/mesosystems – were characterised by 
dysfunction and abandonment. Understanding how these experiences shaped their 
interactions with others, within the context of place and time and in terms of their 
individual/group identity-development required spending time getting to know the children 
and what drove their behaviour, what made them ‘tick’, both in the moment – such as 
‘showing off…with the boys’(Rhydian) – and over time.  
 
Interrupting these cycles meant providing boundaries and support, meeting educational 
needs, ‘making you feel rewarded’ (Gareth). Trust was key. Intensive supervision provided an 
extended period of regular interactions, becoming increasingly complex as a trusting 
relationship was built, often through practical activities – kayaking or ‘working with animals’ 
(Elis). These activities represent positive ‘moments’ of interaction and relationship-building, 
in contrast to long-term experiences of stigmatisation and exclusion. Workers emphasised 
engaging with ‘families, not just the individual’ (YM04), departing from a deficit view of 
children’s lives, working instead with what is present and possible at that moment. 
Understanding the need to sequence responses over time – ‘we need to address this before 
we can work on that’ (YW18) – rather than insisting on rigid processes.  
 
A social-ecological lens thus locates adolescent offending ItM in an historic/cultural sense and 
its unique social/relational context, enabling youth justice assessments, interventions and 
outcomes – indeed any responses to children’s harmful behaviour – to be accurate, well-
informed and appropriate to young lives. 
 
Diversion ItM 
Children’s tendency to act ItM can be better understood with reference to the practice of 
youth diversion. Many youth justice systems are premised on the concept that formal 
systemic contact is uniquely damaging and criminogenic for children. Diversionary measures 
– those that aim to reduce children’s contact with the criminal justice system by channelling 
them out of the system – have thus been introduced with fervour during the last three to four 
decades (Jordan and Farrell, 2013; Pratt, 1986). Systems of diversion are supported in a range 
of normative frameworks relating to youth justice, including in United Nations frameworks 
such as the Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (United 
Nations, 1985), and the Guidelines on the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (United 
Nations, 1990).  
 
Diversionary measures – such as police warnings, cautions, referral to therapeutic programs 
and youth justice conferencing – are typically packaged in a hierarchy. For example, across 
Australia’s states and territories, youth justice legislation provides that a child is first to be 
offered the least intrusive diversionary measure (e.g. a verbal warning from police) before 
being escalated through a series of more serious diversionary practices for subsequent 
wrongdoing. 
 
Despite the enthusiastic uptake of youth diversion, little scholarly attention has been paid to 
its conceptual or theoretical underpinnings (Richards, 2014). By and large, it is simply 
accepted that diversion is in the best interests of children (cf Weatherburn et al. 2012; for a 
discussion see Richards & Lee, 2013). It has rarely been recognised, therefore, that 
diversionary systems are premised on a classical model of human behaviour that is at odds 
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with the reality of children’s risk-taking and offending behaviour. While systems of 
diversionary hierarchy assume rational subjects who will learn from the consequences of 
previous offending and make decisions based on objective and rational calculations of risk 
and reward, this is at odds with the realities not only of much offending generally, but of 
children’s offending specifically. As has been well-documented, children’s offending is 
typically unplanned, spontaneous, expressive and public (Cunneen et al. 2015). It is also 
heavily peer-driven compared with adults’ offending (Gatti, Tremblay and Vitaro, 2009). As 
Steinberg’s (2005) research shows, children understand risk and can weigh up the potential 
risks and rewards of a particular act, but often make decisions on social and/or emotional 
bases such as peer influence. Diversionary hierarchies also eschew the reality that pushing 
the boundaries – by taking risks, including illegal ones – is part and parcel of adolescent 
identity formation (Cunneen et al. 2015).   
 
It is increasingly recognised that for the ‘rational actor’ basis of much youth justice policy is 
at odds with the offending and criminalisation patterns of children with cognitive disabilities 
(Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee, 2013). Cognitive disabilities, including Foetal 
Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy 
and Legal Affairs, 2012), can inhibit children’s capacity to resist behaving impulsively – in other 
words, ItM. A range of personal characteristics associated with cognitive impairment, 
including impulsivity, are considered predisposing factors to offending (French 2007; 
Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee, 2013). Moreover, recent research suggests 
that such characteristics may not only increase the initial likelihood of a child with a cognitive 
disability coming into contact with the police as ‘gatekeepers‘ to youth justice systems, but 
may impede their capacity and opportunity to evade ongoing interaction with youth justice 
systems and contribute towards high levels of overrepresentation (Richards & Ellem, 2019). 
Again, therefore, policies based on diversion are likely to fall short where the spontaneous 
and ItM nature of children’s actions fail to be taken into account. In practice, systems of youth 
diversion that deny the situated realities of marginalised children’s lives and behaviours can 
result in counterproductive outcomes. For example, while the legal doctrine of doli incapax 
(now abolished in the UK) in theory provides a protective mechanism for children, 
diversionary systems that assume calculating, rational actors have resulted in a sharp 
decrease in its use (see generally O’Brien and Fitz-Gibbon, 2017). If a child has been the 
subject of a diversionary measure such as a caution, which requires an admission of 
wrongdoing, the legal argument that they are doli incapax becomes untenable in the future. 
As a consequence, even those measures expressly designed to limit children’s contact with 
the criminal justice system can have the opposite effect if the lived realities of youth offending 
are ignored. A recognition that children act ItM thus needs to more clearly inform even those 
measures that on the surface appear to be designed primarily to reduce their contact with 
youth justice systems.  
 
In the moment in the future 
In their introduction, the lead authors asserted that the dominant explanations of children’s 
involvement in crime are often socio-political and cultural constructions developed by adults 
with little input from children themselves. The most influential of these accounts draws 
heavily on the ‘Risk Factor Prevention Paradigm’ (RFPP) (see Farrington, 2000) which places 
the blame for offending at the door of individual children and their families while downplaying 
the relevance of socio-structural constraints.  While historians have debated whether children 
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were treated as mini-adults in medieval times, there is overwhelming agreement that 
childhood itself is a modern invention, with the 1600s demarcating a period in Europe where 
children came to be defined as innocent and in need of protection and care (Heywood, 2018). 
This attitude toward children came to the fore by the Victorian period and eventually became 
the philosophical basis for the juvenile court. Paradoxically, however, contemporary times, as 
evidenced by RFPP, have come full circle with presumptions of children as fully rational and 
responsible beings – like “mini-adults.” As several critics have argued, risk-orientated 
accounts are fundamentally flawed (Case and Haines, 2009; Goddard and Myers, 2018).  
Children live in the ‘here and now’.  Therefore, explanations of their involvement in offending 
must be understood from their lived experience as they negotiate, resist and construct their 
social situation. This raises two issues in explaining and responding to children’s offending. 
 
First, research and practice guided by the concept of ItM must recognize children’s right to 
be actively involved in all decisions that affect their lives.  It must respect their views by tuning 
in to their understanding of the risks and needs that they experience in their daily lives and 
how they negotiate them.  Such principles adhere to article 12 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC, 1989) and other European Human Rights 
Standards (see Council of Europe, 2010) which stress the importance of protecting the child’s 
right to participation. 
 
The second core issue raised by the ItM concept relates to concerns about social justice.  The 
overriding problem for children in conflict with the law is not offending but social 
disadvantage.  Such children have experienced high levels of socio-economic deprivation in 
every aspect of their personal and social life (Jacobson et al, 2010) and contact with youth 
justice systems simply reinforces the damage (McAra and McVie, 2010). The research 
evidencing their vulnerabilities and experience of deprivation is not new and has been known 
by policymakers and practitioners for many years.  Yet little has changed.  Underpinned until 
recently by the RFPP, youth justice policy and practice remain deficit-focused, intent on 
criminalising children for their social welfare difficulties by conflating need with risk of 
reoffending (Gray, 2016).  Current austerity measures and cuts in public spending have further 
reinforced the pressure on children and their families to take responsibility to address their 
own risk and needs irrespective of the structural impediments under which they live.  To be 
ItM we need to listen to children’s accounts of how they negotiate socio-economic 
disadvantage on a daily basis.  What is needed is a ‘here and now’ social justice response 
informed by children’s voices. 
 
In this respect there is hope on the horizon as in recent years several ‘new frontiers’ have 
opened with the appearance of ‘children first’ youth offending services (see Byrne and Case, 
2016; Smith and Gray, 2018) which are informed by a ‘positive youth justice’ agenda (Haines 
and Case, 2015). Such services strive to adopt a markedly ‘child- friendly’ approach which 
draws upon the 1989 UNCRC and Council of Europe (2010) guidelines. Children who offend 
are viewed as first and foremost children with complex social welfare needs which must be 
addressed holistically. ‘Children first’ teams are structured to deliver integrated ‘one-stop-
shop’ support services which call upon universal entitlements. All the above places the 
spotlight on the child, as the assessment of need is not conflated with risk of offending, as in 
the RFPP, but takes account of the wider contours of the child’s ‘whole’ personal and social 
situation. ‘Effective’ practice is viewed positively in terms of developing the child’s abilities, 
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resilience and motivation rather than being obsessed with deficits and pathologies as in the 
RFPP. Diversion from formal processing through youth justice systems into universal provision 
to avoid the taint of criminalization is seen to be a crucial component of this process. 
 
Nevertheless, the ‘children first’ approach is not without limitations when put into practice. 
While ‘children first’ agencies offer a more principled, non-criminalising, child-friendly 
experience of youth justice and comply with article 12 of the UNCRC by respecting and 
listening to children’s views, the extent to which such agencies uphold the broader spirit of 
the 1989 Convention by ‘tackling poverty and promoting a wide social justice agenda’, is, as 
McAra (2017:968) argues, questionable. Children’s problems continue to be blamed on 
individual and family deficits, with socio-economic disadvantage given only limited attention. 
Conceptualisations of ‘effective’ intervention likewise remain very narrow, process orientated 
and mainly avoid facing up to the structural challenges which must be addressed in order to 
achieve ‘social justice’ outcomes. To engage with social justice outcomes the ‘children first’ 
approach must move beyond ‘child-friendly’ platitudes. This would necessitate a more 
strident commitment to challenge and confront structural inequalities through advocacy 
work and social action. In compliance with article 12 of the UNCRC and in response to the 
earlier discussion of participation, both advocacy work and social action could only be 
undertaken in partnership with children. Goddard and Myers (2018) offer some insights into 
how this might be achieved. 
 
Conclusion 
The various contributions to this paper have set out to explore and develop the notion that 
offending behaviour by children, behaviour that can bring them into conflict with the law, can 
best be explained and understood through the notion of ItM: that the behaviour of children 
takes place primarily ItM, where the future consequences of that behaviour are a stranger to 
the child. The contributors have approached the topic from a range of different perspectives. 
Whilst some of these perspectives are complementary, there is not (yet) a unanimity of 
viewpoints: reflecting the nascent quality of ItM theorising and the relatively underdeveloped 
thinking about the consequences of ItM for the treatment of children in conflict with the law. 
 
As much as putting forward a new paradigm for understanding the behaviour of children (that 
may bring them into conflict with the law) and as much as answering questions, this paper 
has raised many more questions: for the authors as well as, hopefully, for readers. There 
remains much work to be done to develop theorising about ItM and in translating it into policy 
and practice. By way of conclusion, therefore, we seek to raise and (tentatively) answer a 
range of questions that have arisen from this work so far. 
 
Are we arguing that children cannot see or understand the consequences of their behaviour 
or actions? Of course not. But this ability is highly mediated in children and nowhere near as 
developed as it is in an adult. We are arguing, however, that when children are bored or 
excited (at extremes of the continuum) their ability to foresee the consequences of their 
actions is very restricted indeed. 
 
Are we arguing that all children are the same (in this regard)? Of course not. Children are 
unique individuals and each child needs to be understood in their own specific circumstances. 
The extent to which any child will be able to understand the consequences of their actions 
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will vary according to their mood, their age, their (neuro)maturity, their social context and so 
on. Old school, Newtonian thinking has no place in modern social science. 
 
Are children just mad, bad or evil? Of course not. Children are not simply mini-adults, with 
adult thinking capabilities. Children are developing social beings, on learning trajectories of 
intense complexity and sophistication; in which both the journey and the outcomes are highly 
individualised, chaotic and unknown (even unknowable). 
 
Can we hold children responsible for their behaviour? Of course not. Well, not entirely. The 
extent to which children can foresee the consequences of their behaviour (and, therefore, be 
held [criminally] responsible for it) varies enormously from child to child. Some children in 
some circumstances may be capable to a significant extent of understanding the 
consequences of their behaviour (although hardly ever to the same extent as a fully 
functioning adult). Most children in most circumstances do not possess this ability. 
 
Can we grow the competence of children to foresee the consequences of their behaviour? 
We do not currently have the academic evidence to answer this question unequivocally but 
the answer seems to be: children will develop the ability to foresee the consequences of their 
behaviour as part of the maturation process of the brain, but this process can be speeded up 
(enhanced) by constructive pro-social interactions with the child. 
 
Is ItM guilty of individualising our understanding of childhood and childhood behaviour (and 
the responsibility for it)? No, not at all. There are important individual aspects of our 
arguments about ItM but, as a number of the sections of this paper argue, there are significant 
socio-structural aspects to ItM thinking, theorising and practice that we must grapple with to 
generate a wholistic set of explanations/understandings of childhood behaviour. 
 
We are all too aware that the arguments set out in this paper are preliminary and there is 
much work yet to do to develop (theoretically, empirically, in practice) the concept that the 
behaviour of children is best understood (and responded to) as ItM. The work we have done 
here is but the first tentative step in articulating ItM thinking. We hope this paper acts as a 
springboard for further academic work and, perhaps more importantly, for a more considered 
approach to responding to children who sometimes find themselves in conflict with the law. 
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